This paper is concerned with the`logical structure' of arithmetical theories. We survey results concerning logics and admissible rules of constructive arithmetical theories. We p r o ve a new theorem: the admissible propositional rules of Heyting Arithmetic are the same as the admissible propositional rules of Intuitionistic Propositional Logic. We p r o vide some further insights concerning predicate logical admissible rules for arithmetical theories.
Introduction
Can we s a y a n ything interesting about the logical structure of constructive arithmetical theories? We m i g h t ask for example what the`logic' of such a theory is. A question with an even more informative a n s w er is: what are the admissible rules of a given arithmetical theory?
This paper is, in a sense, two papers in one. Firstly we survey results concerning logics and admissible rules of arithmetical theories. Secondly, we ll some gaps in our total picture. We show that the propositional admissible rules of Heyting Arithmetic, HA, are the same ones as those of Intuitionistic Propositional Logic, IPC. itself. This characterization will follow from a general lemma.
In subsection 3.3 we present a particularly simple proof that the predicate logical admissible rules of a wide range of constructive theories are complete 0 2 . In the appendix we p r o vide some Orey-H ajek-Friedman style characterizations of predicate logical admissibility for classical arithmetical theories. The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we review what is known about the`logics' of constructive theories. Speci cally, w e w i l l b e i n terested in the case where the logic of a theory is precisely IPC. Some of the results discussed here will be used as lemmas later on in the paper. Section 3 will introduce the basics on admissible rules of arithmetical theories. Section 4 contains the proof of our result concerning the admissible rules of HA. F i n a l l y , in an appendix, we brie y consider what can be said about the predicate logical admissible rules of classical arithmetical theories.
Prerequisites
The paper presupposes some knowledge of the Kripke semantics for constructive theories. See e.g. 27] or 30] . In appendix A we employ some results concerning de nable cuts, restricted proof predicates and the like. A good reference for the material in the appendix is 11] . S e e a l s o 3 7 ] a n d 3 8 ] .
Suppose T is a theory in classical logic. Then the propositional schemes valid in a consistent theory T with classical logic are, trivially, precisely the classical tautologies. The question becomes much more interesting if we consider classical theories and predicate logical schemes (see 44]), or if we enrich the propositional language with a modal predicate for provability (see 1] or 28]).
If we consider constructive theories, already the purely propositional case has some interest. If a theory is`purely constructive', one would surely expect the valid propositional schemes to be precisely the theorems of intuitionistic propositional logic IPC. This turns out to be often the case. However, the proofs are surprisingly non-trivial.
In this section we will survey what is known about propositional and predicate logics of arithmetical theories.
Propositional Logics of Theories
Below I present the necessary de nitions to speak a bit more precisely about substitutitions, propositional schemes and the like.
Let P be acountable set of propositional variables. The language L IPC P is the language of IPC for the variables P. We will denote IPC with this language by: IPC(P). By our earlier convention, we h a ve: L IPC(P) = L IPC P A P-scheme is simply a formula in L IPC P . A s c heme is`valid' in T if all of its substitution instances are T-provable. In most cases we will consider a nite set P. We will usep,q as notation for such nite sets.
Let L beany language of propositional or of predicate logic. A P-substitution for L is a function from P to the set of sentences of L. The set of Psubstitutions for L will be called sub P L . In case L = L T , we will also write sub P T . We extend 2 sub P L in the usual way t o L IPC P by making it commute with the propositional connectives including > and ?. We w i l l u s e ( ) for`the extension of applied to '.
A P-logic is a set of L IPC P -formulas, that extends the set of IPC(P)-tautologies, is closed under modus ponens and under P-substitutions for L IPC P . 1 So for 2 sub P IPC (P) , w e h a ve: 2 ) ( ) 2 . Here are some de nitions.
Let 6 = S sub P T . De ne: P T (S) : = f 2L IPC P j 8 2S T` ( )g In case S is obtained by restricting the range of the substitutions to a class of formulas , we will, par abus de langage, write P T ( ) for P T (S).
Let 2 sub P T . Omitting singleton brackets, we write: P T ( ) : = P T (f g) We call P T ( ) the exact P-theory of for T.
We will omitt the set of substitutions, when we are considering all substitutions of the relevant kind: 1 I feel that this usage of logic is slightly perverse. The correct notion of logic should obviously explicitely contain the machinery for obtaining theorems. The current usage should be viewed as a convenient w ay of speaking in the present context. P T := P T (sub P T ).
It is easy to see that P T is a P-logic and that, for any P-logic , we have P = . We will identify IPC(P) w i t h P IPC . Note that P T (S) need not generally be a logic.
It is easy to see that if jPj jQj, t h e n P IPC(Q) = IPC(P). We s h o w: Theorem 2.1 If jPj > jQj, t h e n P IPC(Q) ) IPC(P).
Proof
Suppose jPj > jQj. Remember that we assumed P and Q to be countable. So Q must be nite. Takep P, with jQj < jpj. Let 
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Note also that if T is any consistent classical theory, whether in propositional or in predicate logic, we h a ve P T = CPC(P). Here CPC is the classical propositional calculus.
Predicate Logics of Theories
Let L be a language of predicate logic. Let T be a theory. An L-scheme is simply a sentence in L. A scheme is`valid' in T if all of its interpretations are T-provable. An interpretation M assigns to a relation symbol R of L formulas of L T with designated variables corresponding to the argument places of R. We usually assume that M(R) contains no other variables than those representing the argument places. In case L contains function symbolswe treat f(x 1 x n ) = y as a relation symbol. M sends an arbitrary formula of L to the result of replacing all its relation symbols R by M(R), changing the variables representing the argument places into the variables following a given occurrence of R in . In case contains function symbols, we rst apply the well-known procedure for reducing the nesting degree of function symbols to 1 and than run the procedure we just described. In case we eliminate function symbols, we demand that the interpreting theory veri es the translations of the statements expressing the fact that f(x 1 x n ) = y represents the graph of a function. Thus being an interpretation becomes dependent not only on the interpreting language, but on the interpreting theory. We call the class of interpretations of L in T: int L T .
We often do not want simple interpretations but relative interpretations. A relative i n terpretation is like a n i n terpretation with the following additional feature. There is an associated special formula (x) representing the domain of the interpretation. In relative i n terpetations we replace 8x : : : by 8x( (x) ! : : : ) and we replace 9x : : : by 9x( (x)^: : : ). We demand that the interpreting theory proves 9x (x). Thus, whether something is a relative interpretation or not will depend on the interpreting theory even in the absence of function symbols. We call the class of relative i n terpretations of L in T: relint L T . In case S is obtained by restricting the range of the substitutions to a class of formulas , we will, par abus de langage, write rel L T ( ) for rel L T (S). We will omitt the set of relative i n terpretations, when we are considering all interpretations of the relevant kind: rel L T := rel L T (relint P T ). It is easy to see that the unrelativized interpretations can be viewed as a subclass of the relativized interpretations. When we consider unrelativized interpretations, we simply drop the superscript rel. So, L T := rel L T (int P T ).
It is clear that, when we v i e w P and L as signatures, our de nitions for propositional logic are simply special cases of the ones for predicate logic. Here are a few further convenient notations.
We s a y t h a t is relatively interpretable in T or that T interprets .
We note in passing that Tarski We end this section by p r o viding a necessary condition for arithmetical theories to satisfy de Jongh's theorem. 3 Consider a theory T. Suppose N 2 int R T .
Suppose we h a ve: is an open problem:
1. P HA+MP+ECT 0 , 2. f 2L IPC P j 9 e 8 2sub P HA HA`e r ( )g, 3. f 2L IPC P j 8 2sub P HA 9e N j = e r ( )g, 4. f 2L IPC P j 9 e 8 2sub P HA N j = e r ( )g.
One could well imagine that it would be possible to prove the sets (1) and (2) to be equal without having a characterization. Similarly for (3) and (4).
The situation for substitutions in predicate logic is even more spectacular. 
Exactness and Extension
An exact theory is the theory of a single interpretation. If U = P T ( ), or, analogously, f o r the predicate logical case, U = L T (M), one says that or M is a faithful interpretation of U in T. For example, the Beltrami-Poincar e interpretation of hyperbolic geometry in Euclidean geometry is faithful, the usual interpretation of PA in ZF is not. We will show that exact theories inherit a salient property, viz. the extension property, from their interpreting theories. To set the stage, we rst introduce the idea of E-preservation. Consider a class K of models (of whatever kind). Let R be a binary relation on K. A class ; of formulas (with a semantics in K) is E-preserved (in K) by R if, for all K 2 K, whenever K ;, then, for some N with K R N, N ;. In a similar way w e can de ne A-preservation, by demanding that then, for all N with K R N, N ;.
Here is an example of a characterization of a class of formulas employing Epreservation, a characterization of formula classes with the disjunction property, due to Dick de Jong. See his 2]. Theorem 2.6 (De Jongh) Let K be the class of (not necessarily rooted) Kripke P-models. De ne: K N i K is a generated (i.e. upwards closed) submodel of N and N is rooted.
Suppose ; L IPC P . Then ; has the disjunction property i ; is E-preserved by .
Let L be a language of either intuitionistic propositional logic or of intuitionistic predicate logic. Let K be the class of Kripke L-models. We de ne: K l N i N is rooted and K is the result of omitting the root of N. We say that ; L has the extension property i ; i s E-preserved by l. Alternatively, w e s a y that ; is extendible. So ; has the extension property i f a n y (non rooted) model of ; can be extended with a new root preserving the validity of ;. We start with a triviality. Theorem 2.7 Every extendible theory has the disjunction property. The theorem is immediate by theorem 2.6 and the fact that l is a subrelation of . The next theorem establishes a connection between exactness and extendibility.
Theorem 2.8 Let T be an extendible theory with language L T and let 2 sub P T . Then, P T ( ) has the extension property.
Proof
Say E := P T ( ). Consider any non-rooted Kripke P-model K. Suppose that K E. Let := Th(K). Clearly, E . Consider 2 L IPC P n . We claim that ( ) 6 T ( ).
Suppose that ( )`T ( ). Then, for some 2 , T` ( ! Theorem 2.10 (Ghilardi) Suppose that " 2 L IPC p has the extension property. Then, for some 2 subp IPC(p) , we have " = " . Note that Ghilardi's theorem, as stated here, implies that if " 2 L IPC q and " is p P-exact, then " isq q-exact. Ghilardi 's theorem will be used as a lemma in the characterization of the admissible rules of HA.
3 Admissible Rules
Finitary Admissible Rules
Let T be a theory and let S sub P T . A hP T S i -admissible rule is a pair of L IPC P -formulas h i such that, for all 2 S , T` ( ) ) T` ( ). We s a y that h i is P T -admissible if it is hP T sub P T i-admissible. De ne:
A P T (S) is the set of hP T S i -admissible rules. A P T = A P T (sub P T ). S P T :, h i 2 A P T (S). P T :, h i 2 A P T . Note that P T (S) is completely determined by A P T (S), since 2 P T (S) i h> i 2 A P T (S). We de ne one more set of rules, the implications of a theory. = := fh i j ( ! ) 2 g. It is well known that e.g. A fp q rg IPC(p q r) 6 = = IPC(p q r) , since, for example, :p ! (q _ r) fp q rg IPC(p q r) (:p ! q) _ (:p ! r) but :p ! (q _ r) 0 IPC(p q r) (:p ! q) _ (:p ! r).
Here is the simplest possible result on admissible rules. Moreover, every admissible rule of T is also admisible for the logic of T. To b e precise: let : = P T . We have: = A P T A P .
Proof
The rst inclusion is obvious. Suppose that P T . We prove P .
Consider any 2 sub P IPC(P) and suppose ` ( ). It follows that, for all 2 sub P T , T`( )( ). Ergo, for all 2 sub P T , T`( )( ). We m a y conclude ` ( ). Note that (:) # considered as an operation of the free Heyting algebra on generatorsp is an interior operation. This operation is fully determined by its xed points. These xed points are precisely given by the disjunctions of formulas with the extension property. Ghilardi's theorem provides a new proof of Rybakov's theorem 3.2. For the proof the reader is referred to Ghilardi's paper 8].
In the next few theorems, we present some results on 1 -substitutions over HA. Why are 1 -substitutions interesting? One motivation is the fact that they play an important role in the study of the provability logic of HA. The characterization of the closed fragment o f HA in 36], 39] essentially uses the results described below. The material has some clear analogies to the results described above on substitutions over IPC.
A NNIL(P)-formula is a P-formula with no nestings of implications to the left. We t a k e :p to be an abbreviation of (p ! ? ). So (p ! (q _ :q)) and :p are NNIL-formulas, and ((p ! q) ! q) is not a NNIL-formula. Theorem 3.4 (Van Benthem, Visser) The NNIL(P)-formulas are p r ecisely the L(P)-formulas A-preserved under taking sub Kripke models (modulo provable equivalence). Here a submodel is a full submodel given by an arbitrary subset of the nodes. 
In nitary Admissible Rules
In this subsection, we g i v e an example to the e ect that the in nitary propositional admissible rules of IPC and HA di er. 5 Let T be a theory and let S sub P T . A hP T S i -admissible in nitary rule is a pair h; i, where ; L IPC P and 2 L IPC P , such that, for all 2 S, T` (;) ) T` ( ). Here (;) = f ( ) j 2 ;g. We say that h; i is P T -admissible if it is hP T sub P T i-admissible. De ne:
A 1 P T (S) is the set of hP T S i -admissible in nitary rules. A 1 P T = A 1 P T (sub P T ). Clearly, is recursive. Moreover, an simple Kripke model argument shows that has the disjunction property. Let be as given in lemma 3.8. Since 0 IPC(p q) q, we have: HA + 0` ( ) and HA + 0 0 (q). Consider with (p) = (p) and (q) : = ( 0 ! (q)). By elementary propositional reasoning, we nd HA` ( ) and HA 0 (q).
Admissible Rules in the Predicate Logical Language
To get our discussion o the ground, we need to x a basic arithmetical theory. We take, in this section, as our theory iEA. iEA is the constructive v ersion of EA, elementary arithmetic also known as I 0 + Exp. The theory consists of intuitionistic predicate logic, the usual universal axioms for successor, plus and times, 0 -induction and an axiom expressing the totality o f e x p o n e n tiation. iEA is nitely axiomatizable. We will use \E" to denote a single axiom axiomatizing iEA. 6 We present some results about admissible rules for arithmetical theories.
Here is an example of a principle that holds for any RE theory T, whether it contains any arithmetic or not.
| E^Con(T ) rel R ?: In fact, | is just a reformulation of the Second Incompleteness Theorem.
We show that for a wide class of constructive theories T with a modicum of arithmetic we h a ve that, for a suitable L, A L T is complete 2 . Consider an RE theory T. Suppose N is a relative i n terpretation of iEA in T with domain . We remind the reader of Friedman's amazing theorem that the disjunction property implies the existence property. Theorem 3.9 (Friedman) Let T be as described above. Suppose T has the disjunction property. Then, T has the N-numerical existence p r operty, i.e. for any (x), with only x free, if T9 x( (x)^ (x)), then, for some natural number n, T9 x( (x)^N (x = n)^ (x) ) . (We could also write T` (n), a s l o n g a s we keep in mind that we are d e aling with the numeral according to N.)
Proof
The proof is word for word Friedman's original proof, just keeping an eye o p e n to see whether everything can be done using just iEA. N o t e t h a t w e need things like the provable decidability of the proof-predicate and the presence of the 1 -minimum principle.
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The business of the interpretation helps us to apply Friedman's theorem e.g. to a theory like iZF in which t h e n umerical language is only present via interpretation. Since, the numerical existence property in its turn implies the disjunction property, F riedman's theorem tells us that the numerical existence property i s invariant', i.e. independent o f t h e c hoice of the interpretation of iEA.
Here is an alternative f o r m ulation of Friedman's theorem. Let's extend R to a language L by adding a unary predicate symbolP . Let N P := ] extend N by i n terpreting P by . We demand that has at most x free. Suppose T has the disjunction property. Then, we h a ve, T N P := ]9 x P x ) 9 n 2 ! T N P := ]`P n :
We can now p r o ve our theorem. Theorem 3.10 Let T be as described above. Suppose T has the disjunction property. Then, A rel L T is complete 2 .
Proof
Let e be an index of a partial recursive function. We s h o w h o w to reduce the problem of the totality o f n:fegn to A rel L T . We claim: 8n fegn # , ( E^9x P x rel L T 9x ( P x 9y T (e x y ) ) Here T(u v w) stands for Kleene's T-predicate. We v erify our claim.
\(" Assume the lhs. of the claim. Consider any natural numbern. Clearly, T N P := (x = n)]`E^9x P x : (Here n is the N-numeral.) Ergo, by assumption, T N P := (x = n)]9 x ( P x 9y T (e x y ) ) : I.o.w. T N9 y T (e n y ). Since T is consistent and has the numerical existence property, T satis es 1 -re ection. We m a y conclude that fegn #.
\(" Assume 8n fegn #. Consider any relative i n terpretation M and suppose T M`E^9x P x . By Friedman's theorem, for some n, T M`P n . By assumption, fegn #. Hence, by 1 -completeness, T M 9 y T (e n y ). We m a y conclude T M 9 x ( P x 9y T (e x y ) ) .
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Certainly not all arithmetical theories give r i s e t o 2 -complete sets of admissible rules. For example A L PA is not complete 2 . This is immediate from the characterization of A L PA given in appendix A.
What Extendability Means for Admissibility
In this section we will show a.o. that the admissible rules of HA are the same as the admissible rules of IPC. This result follows from the main lemma of this section. We will prove the main lemma from two l e m m a s . These lemmas are stated and proved in the next two subsubsections.
The Main Lemma

The Disjunction Property
The lemma of this subsubsection tells us that certain restrictions of sets of formulas with the disjunction property inherit the disjuction property. 
e-Compactness
We prove a kind of compactness result. We state the lemma in the in nitary version, where in fact we will use only the nitary one.
De nition 4.3 Let extens P be the set of L IPC P -formulas with the extension property.
A set of L IPC P -formulas ; is e-compact if ;` ) 9"2extens P ;`" and "` . I n (q) is the set of L IPC q -formulas of which the nesting degree of implications is smaller or equal than n.
Theorem 4.4 ; has the extension property i ; is e-compact.
Proof
Suppose ; has the extension property. We s h o w that ; is e-compact. Consider q P . De ne ; n (q) : = f 2I n (q) j ;` g. Clearly, ; n (q) is nitely axiomatizable. Moreover, whenever ;` there are n andq P such that ; n (q)` .
Without loss of generality w e m a y restrict ourselves to n 1. So it is su cient to show t h a t ; n (q) has the extension property, f o r n 1.
Consider any non-rooted P-model K with K ; n (q). Let : = Thq n;1 (K) : = Th(K) \ I n;1 (q): We show that, for 2 I n;1 (q), ; ` ) ` , i.o.w. that ; is I n;1 (q)-conservative o ver .
Suppose ; ` . Then, for some 2 , ;`( ! ). We h a ve, clearly, that ( ! ) 2 I n (q), and, hence, ( ! ) 2 ; n (q). We n d K , since 2 , and K ( ! ), since ( ! ) 2 ; n (q). So K . Moreover 2 I n;1 (q), so 2 .
Consider any P-model M such that Th(M) = dc(; We show that c ; n (q). ; has the extension property and, hence, the disjunction property. So, by lemma 4.2, ; n (q) has the disjunction property. Our proof is by induction on 2 ; n (q). The cases of atoms and conjunction are trivial. The case of disjunction is immediate by the fact that ; n (q) has the disjunction property. Suppose that = ( ! ) 2 ; n (q). We want to show that c ( ! ). Clearly b ( ! ) a n d 2 I n;1 (q). Consider any k c and suppose k . To s h o w k . In case k 6 = c, w e are done by the fact that k is in K and K ; n (q). Suppose k = c. Then it follows that b and, hence, b and, thus, c .
We prove the converse. Suppose ; is e-compact. It is our standing assumption that P is countable. Say, P = fp 1 p 2 g . Letp i := fp 1 p i g. Take 0 := > and let n+1 be the formula with the extension property s u c h that: 1. ;` n+1 , 2. n+1` n^V ; n (p n ) 3. n+1 is the rst in a suitable enumeration of formulas satisfying (1), (2) . We prove by induction that n is de ned and that ;` n . It is immediate that ; is axiomatized by the n . Consider any P-model K of ;. For each n we can add a new root b n to K such t h a t b n n . Let Tree be the set of 0,1 sequences such t h a t 2 Tree i , for in nitely many n, for all i < length( ), b n p i , i = 1 . It is easy to see that Tree has an in nite path . Add a new root c to K, setting c p i , i = 1 . It is immediate that c ;. there is an " 2 extensp with p T ( )`" and "` . By theorem 2.10, we can nd a 2 subp IPC(p) , such t h a t " = " . Ergo, IPC(p)` ( ). By assumption, IPC(p)` ( ). Hence, " ` and, so, p T ( )` . We may conclude:
Remark 4.5 There are a few alternative w ays to set up the machinery leading to the main lemma. If you think about the extension property, it is easy to see that the forcing in the new bottom just depends on the atomic forcing in the new bottom and the theory of the original model. This shows that we can think of the extension property in a purely syntactical way. Thus we could set up things using slash theoretic methods rather than Kripke models. This alternative i s v ery close to our present set-up. My choice for Kripke models is purely a matter of taste. A second alternative approach, is just in the other direction: rather less than more syntactical. It is to use bounded bisimulations in the way Silvio Ghilardi uses them in 8]. This approach has the advantage of connecting to more theory. It is, perhaps, in the end more beautiful and, again perhaps, more open to generalization. However, it would take a bit more work to set it up.
Applications of the Main Lemma 4.2.1 Intended Consequences
It was our intention in proving the main lemma, to characterize the admissible rules of HA. Here is the argument. Every Kripke Model of HA is extendible by ! preserving the validity o f HA in the model. Adding root ! is called Smory nski's operation. So, HA has the extension property. We already know t h a t HA satis es de Jongh's Theorem. By the main lemma, we m a y conclude that the admissible rules of HA are the admissible rules of IPC.
Note that if S T sub P L , then A P T (T ) A P T (S). Since we have de Jongh's Theorem for 1 -substitutions, it is clear that we should be able to restrict the substitutions leading to the characterization of the admissible rules.
Inspection of the proof gives us: Ap HA (Boole( 1 )) = Ap IPC(p) . 
Random Applications
In this subsubsection we p r o vide a few more or less randomly chosen examples: the theory of groups and the theory of elds. For information about these theories, see e.g. van Dalen en Troelstra's book 31].
The basic theory of apartness APP is given by the following axioms.
ID The usual axioms for identity AP1 :
Note that AP2 follows from the other axioms. If the language has an n-ary function symbolf, w e will often insist that the corresponding function is strictly extensional:
The constructive theory of groups with apartness GROUP ap is formulated in the language with symbols =, #, , ;1 , e. Its axioms are the apartness axioms plus the usual universal axioms of group theory and, nally, t wo axioms expressing the strict extensionality o f and ;1 .
We s h o w t h a t P GROUPap = IPC(P). Consider any formula 2 L IPC P such that IPC(P) 0 . Suppose that the propositional variables of are among p = fp 0 p n;1 g. Let K bearootedp-countermodel to .
We c o n vert K to a model K 0 for GROUP ap . First, K 0 has the same ordering as K. Let be an injective mapping of n = f0 n ;1g to the prime numbers.
Let Z i be the additive group of the integers modulo i. Z 1 is the trivial group.
De ne a mapping : K n ! ! as follows.
We assign to the node k the group Q n;1 i=0 Z (k i) . We stipulate that in a given node two elements are apart whenever they di er. The further details are obvious. De ne:
It is easy to see that k K , k K 0 ( ). Ergo: K 0 1 ( ).
GROUP ap has the extension property, since we can always add the trivial group as root preserving GROUP ap . We may conclude that Ap GROUPap = Ap IPC(p) .
The weak constructive theory of elds FIELD ; has a language with the following symbols: = , # , , +, ;, 0, 1. FIELD ; has as axioms the apartness axioms, the usual universal axioms of the theory of commutative rings, axioms expressing the strong extensionality o f + a n d , plus the following axioms. Note that in FIELD char=0 we can derive o f a n y t wo di erent elements of Q that they are apart. We can easily prove d e Jongh's theorem for FIELD char=0 . We simply proceed as in the case of groups, only now w e assign to the node k the structure Q(f p (k i) j i 2 ng). We take (p i ) : = ( 9x x 2 = (i) ). Note that we automatically obtain de Jongh's theorem for FIELD ; and FIELD too.
FIELD ; has the extension property. We can always add Z as root, preserving FIELD ; . Here we arrange it so that no two di erent elements of Z are apart at the root. FIELD does not have the extension property. FIELD char=0 , on the other hand, does have the extension property. We can always add Q as a root, preserving FIELD char=0 . Here we stipulate that whenever two rationals are di erent then they are apart at the root. We m a y conclude that Ap FIELD Let Q be Robinson's Arithmetic. We w ork with a s l i g h tly stronger theory Q + in which the methodology of de nable cuts works smoothly. Q + is Q plus the axioms expressing that the usual ordering on the natural numbers is a linear ordering. It is well known that Q interprets Q + . We will call T arithmetical or an arithmetic if Q + is interpretable in T. 7 We x some notations and introduce some conventions.
R is the arithmetical language, with 0 S + .
We write for the formalization of cut-free or tableaux provability. See e.g. 43] for a description of tableaux provability. We write r for cut-free or tableaux consistency, s o r is : :. 2 stands for ordinary provability a n d 3 := :2:, i.o.w. 3 means ordinary consistency.
2 n stands for provability w i t h a p r o o f in which all (non-logical) axioms used have G odelnumbers smaller than n and in which only formulas occur of complexity smaller than n. 3 n := :2 n :.
Unless in these cases where it is stipulated otherwise, our theories are RE. In our rst few theorems, we connect admissibility for substitutions in an arbitrary language with admissibility for substitutions in the arithmetical language. 
). Taking M := N K , w e n d T M . Hence, by assumption, T M . But, then, T N: (Q +^r CQC(L) ( ^: )). Since, by assumption, T N`Q + , we may conclude: T N` CQC(L) ( ! ). 9 2 A theory T is sequential if there is an interpretation N of Q + for which w e h a ve a good theory sequences of all objects of the theory in T and where we can nd elements of the sequences by projecting using the N-numbers. See 11] .
The relevant feature of sequential theories here is the possibility of constructing partial truth-predicates in such theories. This allows us to prove things like cut-free consistency of nite subtheory on a de nable cut.
Theorem A.2 Let T be a classical, sequential theory. Then,
Proof Suppose that N provides the numbers involved in the sequentiality o f T. Assume the antecedent of the theorem. Suppose that T K , for some K 2 relint L T . Since our theory is sequential, we can produce a de nable N-cut, I, s u c h t h a t 1. TǸ ( I( CPC(L) : ) ) ! K (: ), 8 Another way to obtain the same result is as follows. First we p r o ve that, for a suitable de nable cut I, Q +^r CQC(L) Ì 3 CQC(L) n . This uses the fact that cut-elimination for an n-proof is only multi-exponential. Then we construct a relative i n terpretation O, s u c h t h a t Q +^3 CQC(L) n Ò . We obtain this O by the ordinary formalized Henkin construction applied to formulas of complexity below n. See 37] . Take K := I O . 9 We work with a version of tableaux provability in which the transformation from a tableaux proof of :( ^: ) to a tableaux proof of to ( ! ) i s e a s y , perhaps even simply de nitional.
TǸ
The proof of this fact employs the construction of a partial truth predicate and a v ariant of the standard proof of the re ection principle, using the transition to a de nable cut to compensate for the lack of induction. See, for details, e.g. Corollary A.4 Let T be a classical, sequential theory. We h a ve:
Proof
(1) is immediate. We prove ( 2 ) . In case T is inconsistent, we are immediately becomes the union of a 1 -set with a 1 -set. Examples of theories to which t h e corollary may be applied are GB, ACA 0 , I n , I 0 + Exp, Q + . To e a c h of these theories we m a y add nitely many axioms without invalidating the result |as long as we preserve consistency. The situation for theories satisfying full induction is rather di erent.
Theorem A.8 Suppose there i s a n N with domain , such that T N`Q + and such that T proves full induction w.r.t. the whole language for the N-numbers. We can strengthen the above result by considering re exive and (locally) essentially re exive theories. Consider a theory T and an N 2 arith T . De ne:
T is N-re exive, if for all n 2 !, T N`3 T n >. T is locally essentially N-re exive, if for all n 2 ! and for all 2 sent LT , TǸ (2 T n ) ! . Theorem A.10 Suppose T is locally essentially N-re exive. We have: K is a relative L T -interpretation such t h a t T K . It follows that, for some k, w e h a ve T N`2 T k K( ).
Reason in T N. Suppose 2 CQC(L) n : . Then, certainly, for an appropriate standard numberm, 2 T m K(: ). Taking q := max(k m), we n d 2 T q ?. Quod non, by N-re exivity. We m a y conclude: 3 CQC(L) n .
Leaving T N, we see that T N`3 CQC(L) . By our assumption, we n d : T N`2 CQC(L) n ( ! ). Hence, for some r, w e h a ve T N`2 T r K( ! ). Combining this with T N`2 T k (K( )), we nd that T N`2 T s K( ), where s = m a x ( n r). By re ection, we obtain: TK ( ). 2
Theorem A.10 substantially extends theorem A.8, since local essential re ectiveness is much w eaker than full induction. Our theorems still give no information about Primitive Recursive Arithmetic, PRA. PRA is re exive a n d 1 -sound w.r.t. the identity i n terpretation. The following theorem does the trick. 
